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January  1996. I thank  Lu Jiaqing  for helpful  research  assistance.  Comments  welcome. The  brief  for  this  paper  was  to  sketch  a point  of  intersection 
between  Qmacroeconomics"  and  "structure."  If  I  held  to  the 
conventional  views  of my  profession,  this  would  have  been  a  fairly 
simple  task.  Macro  is macro,  and  structure  is microeconomics.  This 
intellectual  dichotomy  underlies  the  way  we  are  taught  to  think.  It 
also  leads  to  the  common  ground  on  policy  which  has  come  to 
permeate  economics  nowadays  from  the  liberal  center  to  the  far 
right,  according  to  which  one  set  of  instruments  should  set 
macroeconomic  parameters  while  another  assures  that  "markets  work" 
--  for  example  by  providing  training  and  infrastructure,  by 
removing  distortions  in  pecuniary  incentives  and  by  removing 
barriers  to  the  efficient  adjustment  of  prices. 
It is a peculiar  feature  of modern  macroeconomics  that  in  the 
conservative  limit,  it  disappears.  That  is,  if  all  of  the  canons 
of  the  new  classical  economics  hold  --  monetarism,  rational 
expectations  and  market-clearing  --  then  macroeconomics  ceases  to 
exist  except  as  a blown-up  version  of  micro.  Aggregate  supply  and 
demand  models  behave  exactly  as  micro  supply  and  demand  models, 
and  their  message  to  the  policymaker  is,  "hands-off." 
As  we  shall  see,  even  conservative  policymakers  usually  do not 
go  this  far.  Partly  this  is contact  with  practical  reality  --  if 
Robert  Lucas  were  right,  what  would  the policymaker  do?  And  partly 
it  is  the  influence  of  theories  which  compromise  the  conservative 
position,  violating  this  assumption  or  that  in  a quest  for  context 
within  which  limited  macroeconomic  action  becomes  possible.  So  an 
asymmetric  debate  over  macroeconomic  policy  lives  on  in practice  -- 
asymmetric  because  those  advocating  intervention  must  acknowledge 
that  their  grounds  are  ad  hoc,  impure,  theoretically  problematic. 
My  dissent  does  not  labor  under  this  disadvantage,  for  I have 
come  to  reject  the  macro/structure  dichotomy  on  theoretical 
grounds.  To  acknowledge  the  full  extent  of  my  heresy,  I have  come 
to believe  that  the  core  analytical  categories  of microeconomics  -- 
supply,  demand,  price  and  quantity  in  flow  markets  for  current 
inputs  and  outputs  --  have  little  bearing  on  important  policy 
questions  and  that  policy  measures  addressed  to  improving  the 
performance  of  such  markets  are  inherently  misconceived.  Rather, 
the  markets  that  truly  matter  are  either  asset  markets  for  which 
the  rules  are  dramatically  different  than  for  flow  markets,  or,  as 
in the  case  of  the  "labor  market,"  not  markets  at  all  but  a deeply 
structural  set  of  social  relations. 
Once  one  reorganizes  thinking  along  these 
microeconomics  that  slinks  off-stage.  Macroeconomic 
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instruments  of policy  (spending,  taxes,  interest  rates  and  incomes  policy)  are 
then  seen  to be  the major,  certainly  the  critical,  and  perhaps  the 
sole  practical  implements  of  power,  affecting  not  only  the  gross 
level  of  activity  in  the  economy  but  also  through  their 
differential  effects  on  asset  markets  many  features  of  distribution 
and  redistribution.  It becomes  clear  why  conservatives  always  seek 
to  control  the  high  ground  of  deficit  and  interest  rate  policy,  and 
why  liberals  no  matter  how  committed  to  reforms  on  the  "supply- 
side"  defeat  themselves  from  the  beginning  when  they  concede  it. 
This  paper  begins  with  an  examination  of  the  central  market 
metaphor  in  modern  macroeconomics:  the  labor  market  and  its 
ostensible  point  of  equilibrium,  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment. 
I will  argue  that  the  idea  of  a "labor  market"  is  incoherent.  In 
that  case,  the  "natural  rate"  cannot  exist.  This  is  the  simplest 
and  surely  the  central  point. 
The  alternative  construct  is a structure  of  social  relations, 
governed  by  lateral  linkages  and  subject  to  institutional 
modification.  Once  one  visualizes  the  economic  world  in  this  way, 
social  and  economic  policy  becomes  largely  a  matter  of  making 
structural  choices,  and  of  implementing  them  with  macroeconomic  and 
political  instruments. 
The  Importance  of  the  Natural  Rate  Theorv 
In  economics  terminology  is  a  marker.  If  you  say,  "Natural 
Rate  of  Unemployment"  with  a  straight  face,  you  have  as  good  as 
declared  yourself  a  fellow-traveler  of  what  used  to  be  called  the 
Chicago  School.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  you  persist  in using  "NAIRU" 
-- Non-Accelerating-Inflation  Rate  of  Unemployment  --  then  you  are 
a  retrograde  American  Keynesian,  probably  trained  at MIT,  Yale  or 
Princeton,  open  to  the  thought  that  in  the  short  run  and  within 
strict  limits  of  prudence  government  policy  can  sometimes  reduce 
unemployment. 
The  space  between  these  competing  terminologies  virtually 
defines  the  modern  debate  among  full-blooded  academic 
macroeconomists  in America. 
What  is  the  "Natural  Rate  of  Unemployment?"  It  is  the  idea 
that  there  exists  an  organic  equilibrium  of  the  labor  market,  a 
single  level  of unemployment  that  is  consistent  with  any  constant, 
unchanging  rate  of  inflation.  The  "natural  rate"  is what  its  name 
implies:  the  rate  given  by  the  free  operation  of  markets,  blessed 
by  the  Invisible  Hand,  graced  as  equilibrium  in the  Walrasian  sense 
that  once  achieved  neither  excess  supply  of  nor  demand  for  labor 
disturb  it. 
3 The  "natural  rate  hypothesis,"  write  Cross,  Hutchinson  and 
Yeoward,  "has  come  to  dominate  thought  about  what  determines  and 
what  can  be  done  about  unemployment."  Or  as Adams  and  Coe  put  it: 
The  closely  related  concepts  of  the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment  and  potential  output  are  central  to  many 
economic  policy  discussions.  In  the  near  term,  these 
concepts  summarize  the  extent  to  which  inflationary  or 
disinflationary  pressures  exist  in  labor  and  product 
markets;  alternatively,  they  indicate  the  capability  of 
the  economy  to  increase  the  growth  of  employment  and 
output  without  increasing  inflation.  Over  the  medium  and 
long  term,  they  determine  the  sustainable  pace  of  non- 
inflationary  output  and  employment  growth.  (1990,  232-3) 
Thus  we  have,  in  effect,  a  holy  grail  for  policy  guidance, 
wrapped  up  in  a  single  pair  of  ideas,  namely  the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment  and  "potential  output."l  Above  the  "natural  rate"  (or 
below  "potential  output")  disinflationary  pressures  are  predicted. 
Below  the  natural  rate  and  above  potential  output  inflationary 
pressures  will  be  found.  In  the  long  run,  growth  of  employment  at 
the  natural  rate  of  unemployment  governs  the  "sustainable  pace  of 
non-inflationary  employment  growth." 
All  of  this  is  amazingly  non-controversial:  the  partisans  of 
the  natural  rate  terminology  share  these  beliefs  in  full  with  the 
slightly  more  liberal  devotees  of  the  NAIRU.  The  distinction 
between  them,  so  fine  it  can  be  captured  in  a  subordinate  clause, 
is  merely  over  whether  policy  is  implicated  in  the  return  to  the 
natural  rate  or  NAIRU  if  the  economy  happens  to  deviate  from  it. 
For  the  naturalists,  the  answer  is naturally  no:  the  economy  will 
return  to  the  natural  rate  on  its  own.  To  strict  natural  raters, 
doing  nothing  is  always  and  everywhere  the  right  prescription, 
because  the  economy  will  return  to  the  natural  rate  irrespective  of 
starting  position. 
But  for  the  NAIRUvians,  persistent  unemployment  above  the 
natural  rate  is a legitimate  possibility.  It may  reflect  a disorder 
NAIRUvians  acknowledge:  failure  of  relevant  markets  to  clear  with 
satisfactory  speed.  That  being  so,  there  may  be  no  harm  in policy 
measures  to  speed  the  return  to  NAIRU  so  long  as  a  "soft  landing" 
at  the  NAIRU  is carefully  engineered.  And  thus,  for NAIRUvians,  the 
issue  of whether  the  economy  is  or  is  not  near  the  NAIRU  carries  a 
'The  etymology  of  these  two  terms,  the  NRU  and  potential 
output,  is  in  fact  quite  different,  but  that  is  another  story. 
4 policy  significance  that  it  does  not  for  natural-raters.' 
There  is  a catch,  as Adams  and  Coe  quickly  acknowledge: 
Since  neither  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment  nor 
potential  output  is  observed,  empirical  counterparts  of 
these  theoretical  constructs  must  be  estimated. 
A  large  literature  now  exists  on  estimating  the  NRU/NAIRU, 
going  back  to  1970.  For  a stationary  NAIRU,  simple  expressions  can 
be  derived  and  calculated;  alternatives  rest  on  the  individualized 
ratio  of  job-separation  to  job-finding  --  a  structural 
characteristic  of  the  labor  market  in  steady  state  (Hall  1979)  -- 
or  on  a  balancing  of  macroeconomic  adjustment  variables  and 
productivity  improvement  in  the  economy  (see  the  exposition  in 
Galbraith  and  Darity  1992).  As  Juhn,  Murphy  and  Topel  (1991)  have 
noted,  Hall's  original  (1970)  estimates  placed  the  NAIRU  at  3.5 
percent  for  adult  men. 
But  the  damn  thing  does  not  sit  still.  Through  the  1970s  and 
198Os,  econometric  estimates  of  the  NAIRU  showed  an  uncanny 
tendency  to  rise  alongside  actual  unemployment.  Thus,  although 
actual  circumstances  in  say  1974-75  or  1981-82  might  be  thought  at 
first  glance  to  support  a NAIRUvian  position  on unemployment  policy 
(a  large  gap  indicating  the  need  for  expansionary  policy  in  the 
short  run),  econometric  estimates  of  the  NAIRU  undermined  that 
position,  and  pointed  instead  to worsening  conditions  on  the  supply 
side  (deteriorating  demographic  characteristics  of  workers,  an 
increasingly  unstable  job-wage  and  wage-price  dynamic  (see  the 
discussion  in  Gordon  1988).  According  to  characteristic  estimates 
by  Adams  and  Coe: 
The  natural  rate  of  unemployment  is  estimated  to 
have  increased  steadily  from  3.5 percent  in the mid-1960s 
to  a  peak  of  7.25  percent  in  1980,  and  then  to  have 
fallen  back  to  about  5.75  percent  in  1988...  Thus, 
roughly  half  of  the  increase  in actual  unemployment  rates 
from  the  mid-1960s  to  their  peak  in  the  early  1980s  can 
be  attributed  to  increases  in  the  natural  rate. 
At  each  stage  when  the  NAIRU  was  thought  to  be  rising,  uncertainty 
over  where  it  was  and  where  it  might  come  ultimately  to  rest  cut 
against  the  case  for  a policy  of  expansion.  For  who  could  say  when 
' Dark  Princes  can  sometimes  also  be  seen  operating  in  this 
camp,  urging  sotto  vote  that  the  engines  be  gunned  before 
election  time,  knowing  fully  that  an  inflation/  recession  price 
will  be  paid  thereafter. 
5 and  where  exactly  an expanding  economy  might  collide  with  a rising 
natural  rate  of  unemployment  and  ignite  an  inflationary  spiral? 
The  spectrum  in  modern  macro  thus  ranges  from  a  principled 
indifference  to  actual  macroeconomic  conditions,  radical  laissez- 
faire  under  all  circumstances,  to  a  very  limited  case  for 
intervention  in extreme  circumstances.  This  limited  case  turns  on 
two  questions.  First,  does  the  economy  behave  such  that  policy 
intervention  in the  right  circumstances  to  raise  the  actual  rate  of 
growth  and  reduce  unemployment  can  ever  be  effective  once  the 
initial  surprise  wears  off?  Second,  if  so,  is  the  actual  gap 
between  the  actual  unemployment  rate  and  the  NAIRU  large  enough, 
and  known  with  enough  precision,  to  justify  taking  the  risk  of  an 
expansionary  policy  which  might  turn  into  over-expansion?  This  dual 
test  forms  a  high  barrier  against  active  policy  to  fight 
unemployment  or  indeed  for  any  other  purpose. 
Where  is  the  NAIRU  Now? 
To  the  (questionable)  extent  that  the  Federal  Reserve  has  an 
operating  macroeconomic  theory,  it  is NAIRUvian  rather  than  natural 
rate.  As  of  mid-1995,  with  the  NAIRU  estimated  by  numerous 
practitioners  at  5.9  percent  and  falling,  NAIRU-based  theories 
faced  an  interesting  problem.  Actual  unemployment  at  5.5  or  5.7 
percent  had  fallen  below  the  estimated  NAIRU  (where  it  remains  at 
present  writing).  So  how  then  to  interpret  the  rest  of  the  data? 
Had  the  economy  exceeded  the  speed  limits,  indicating  that 
inflationary  pressures  will  emerge  eventually  and  therefore  a 
NAIRUvian  need  to  tighten  up?  Or  did  the  apparent  lack  of 
inflationary  acceleration  mean  that  the  NAIRU  has  perhaps  fallen 
faster  than  estimates  allowed? 
Figure  One  illustrates  the  issue.  A  constant  six  percent 
natural  rate  of  unemployment  does  not  work  for  the  whole  period 
from  1948  to  the  present.  It  is  too  high  for  the  early  years,  and 
cannot  account  for  the  creeping  inflation  of  the  fifties.  And  it  is 
too  low  for  the  seventies.  Making  these  adjustments,  one  must  ask, 
where  is  it  now?  The  inflation  rates  of  the  nineties  look  too  low 
and  stable  for  a  six  percent  NAIRU. 
The  issue  was  a delicate  one.  At  the  Federal  Reserve,  internal 
inflation-tracking  equations  were  said  in  1995  to  match  the  flat 
trend  of  inflation  (about  three  percent  at  an  annual  rate)  quite 
well,  and  therefore  to  point  to  a  future  inflation  rise  that 
justified  a policy  of  tightening  aggregate  demand.  We  had  passed 
the  NAIRU  and  so,  in  Robert  Solow's  ironic  phrase,  "acceleration 
[was]  just  around  the  corner." 
6 The Federal Reserve is inflation-averse, and acts accordingly 
under uncertainty. It tightened in 1994 and 1995 hoping to organize 
a "soft landing" as unemployment fell below six percent.  But then, 
the landing  started  to look  too soft  --  even though unemployment 
remained  well  below  the  six  percent  threshold  and  inflation 
pressures  never even started  !  By July of 1995 the Federal Reserve 
had started lowering interest rates again, even though no official 
re-estimates of the NAIRU were ever, to my knowledge, made public. 
The failure of the six percent NAIRU  represents  only part of 
the  problem.  The  components  of  present  inflation  are  also  not 
consistent  with  the NAIRU  or natural  rate theory.  In particular, 
wage compensation, two-thirds of all costs, remains flat. Therefore 
the whole of the inflation actually experienced stems from the boom 
in profits  and rents,  and the effects  of this boom  on commodity 
prices  and other  incidentals  of the inflation process,  with  some 
contribution from the rising interest costs imposed since February 
1994 by the Federal Reserve's own policy  (see a rare discussion  in 
the  New  York  Times,  April  13,  1995,  Cl).  None  of  present 
inflationary  pressure  stems from wages. 
This  problem  is  illustrated  in  Figure  Two.  The  old 
relationship between inflation and labor costs really has busted up 
since Reagan  fired the air traffic controllers  and he and Volcker 
overvalued the dollar. Prices may be rising at near three percent, 
but money wages are fluctuating near zero.  Indeed we find that all 
inflation accelerations after 1960, with the sole exception of that 
accompanying Richard Nixon's election campaign in 1972, were led by 
prices  and not wages.  The "labor market"  hasn't  been  tight  since 
the fifties; the difference today is only that it is weaker  still. 
How  is  this  to  be  reconciled  with  a  theory  of  inflation 
acceleration  based  on  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment  in  a 
aggregate labor market? It can't be. If labor is in excess demand, 
surely a good  (new)  classical economist must insist that real wages 
be  rising.  They  aren't;  not  even money  wages.  Something  must  be 
wrong with the natural rate model.  (Good economists  at the Federal 
Reserve  know this, and it bothers  them, as it should.) 
Nevertheless  the pursuit  of a "soft landing" continues,  with 
confidence inspired by the fact that model outcomes converge to the 
natural rate. That this is a feature of solution algorithms and not 
of the real world,  insofar as there is no recorded  instance of a 
"soft landing" in the history of monetary  tightenings,  has so far 
not disturbed  the ontological  slumber on Constitution  Avenue. 
7 The  Case  Aaainst  Natural  Rate Theorv 
As  Ronald  Reagan  once  put  it,  "Where's  the  rest  of me?"  If you 
happen  to  think  that  the  performance  of  the  American  economy  is  on 
the  whole  poor  --  too much  poverty  and  unemployment,  for  example  -- 
and  that  something  ought  to  be  done  about  it,  what  place  is  there 
for  you  under  the  macroeconomists'  tent? 
The  NRU/NAIRU  answer  is:  no place  at  all.  For  natural  raters, 
this  answer  is  not  situationally  contingent.  But  even  under  the 
NAIRU  construction,  present  circumstances  are  a cause  for  concern 
about  inflation,  not  unemployment.  Policies  to  attack  social 
problems  are  therefore  relegated  to  the  micro  sphere:  education, 
training,  infrastructure,  welfare  and  welfare  reform.  The 
frustrations  that  this  produces,  when  for  example  training  is 
provided  for  jobs  that  do  not  exist,  goes  unaddressed. 
It  is  not  legitimate  practice  to  redesign  economic  theory 
around  policies  desired  for  ulterior  motives.  But  it  is  equally 
illegitimate  to  reject,  dismiss  or  ignore  argument  and  evidence 
that  have  the  effect  of undermining  core  propositions.  And  this  is 
the  crime  committed,  again  and  again,  by  professional  economics  in 
defense  of  the  NRU/NAIRU  nexus  and  the  narrow  range  of  policies 
that  it  spans. 
This  section  will  argue  the  case  in  two  particulars. 
First,  I  will  argue  that  the  historical  evidence  can  be 
interpreted  quite  well  without  recourse  to  any  natural  rate.  There 
is  a  tendency  for  inflation  to  accelerate  late  in  the  business 
cycle.  Who  can  deny  that?  But  there  is  no  tendency  for  it  to 
accelerate  past  any  particular  unemployment  rate  ---  and  in  fact 
the  actual  unemployment  rates  past  which  inflation  accelerated  have 
differed  in  every  business  cycle. 
Second,  I will  argue  that  the  natural  rate  construct  depends 
on  an  a priori  theoretical  siting  of  the  wage/employment  relation 
in a  "labor  market."  This  is a metaphor,  and  a weak  one.  When  it 
is  dropped,  one  finds  oneself  back  at  the  doorstep  of  Keynes's 
General  Theory,  with  quite  a different  roadmap  for  the  theoretical 
and  policy  task  ahead. 
The  Nomadic  AIRU 
Every  macroeconomics  textbook  sports  a  version  of  Figure 
Three,  on  the  breakdown  of  the  stable  short  run  Phillips  trade-off 
in  the  late  1960s  and  its  replacement  by  the  non-relationship 
8 predicted  in the  late  1960s by Milton  Friedman  and E.S.  Phelps. 
Robert  Lucas  has  called  this  "as  clear-cut  an  experimental 
discrimination  as macroeconomics  is ever  likely  to  see."  (Lucas 
1981) High  inflation  does not  (necessarily) reduce unemployment; 
the actual relationship  is close enough to indeterminate  that one 
can draw a vertical line on the graph and call it the "natural rate 
of unemployment." 
It  is  a  measure  of  something,  not  very  flattering,  about 
economists  that this argument was as persuasive  as it was. For it 
is easy to show that annual data with no indicated  time-path  give 
an impression of scatter that other forms of analysis contradict. 
A version  of the same story, which  I call the "ultimate  Phillips 
Curve"  is presented  as Figure Four. 
Figure Four uses a centered 12-month moving average of monthly 
data for both  inflation and unemployment.  The advantage of months 
is many more data points; that of moving  averages  is to smooth out 
noise in the monthly data. The empirical picture  one arrives at is 
very different.. 
As  the  figure  shows,  and  conservatives  may  take  some 
satisfaction,  the Phillips curve does move  from shallow to steep, 
and  ultimately  to  vertical,  as  the  business  cycle  expansion 
proceeds. This happened in 60-69, in 71-74, in 77-80.  However,  on 
no  two  occasions  did  the  AIRU  (accelerating-inflation-rate-of- 
unemployment)  coincide.  The NAIRU  is  a non-observable  constant. 
The AIRU,  in constrast,  is observable but nomadic. 
Further, the pattern of widening  gyres reversed  itself after 
the deep  recession  of 1982. Through  the  198Os, unemployment  fell 
without  wage pressures  and without  sharp rises  in inflation.  The 
recession  of 1989 supervened  while  inflation  was  low by historic 
standards. And  in the past three years,  1992-1994, there has been 
falling  unemployment  with  falling  unit  labor  costs  and  no  rise 
whatever  in inflation.  We  do not  know where  the nomadic  AIRU  is 
now, or even if it still exists. But there is no case in this data 
for a single natural  rate, nor even for one shifting  in line with 
known changes of labor supply. The case for an end-of-cycle supply- 
shock interpretation  of rising inflation  is just too strong. 
q  The L  ial Mvth 
Let us turn to a more theoretical issue. What does it mean  in 
principle to say that "the" labor market  is tight, or slack, or in 
equilibrium?  To the economist  these notions  rest on the familiar 
notion of supply and demand: a slack labor market  is one in which 
labor  is in excess  supply  (there is unemployment),  and therefore 
9 downward  pressure  on  the  real  value  or  purchasing  power  of  the 
money wage. A tight market is one in which unemployment  is low and 
therefore  real wages are rising. 
To an economist, a market is defined by the plausible presence 
of demand and  supply curves, which is to say of schedules of price 
and quantity, of bids and offers, on both sides of the transaction. 
It  is  this,  and  only  this,  that  makes  possible  systematic 
statements  about  the  effects  of  change  (such as,  "a decrease  in 
price  will  raise  the  quantity  demanded").  Such  statements  are 
plausible in the case of apples, for example  (even  though there are 
many  varieties  and grades of apples) or for fish  (though an even 
wider  variety  exists), because  in the aggregate  different  apples 
and  different  fish  are  reasonably  close  substitutes  for  one 
another, and because we can plausibly  imagine prices  adjusting  in 
response to shortage and surplus or changes of consumer mood. 
The labor market has never been a market  in this sense. Each 
individual  worker  brings  a  complex  package  of  characteristics, 
skills, job history and reputation to each possible  job match.  The 
range of substitutability  is extraordinarily  narrow. While people 
do change jobs after an early age most never change  from one line 
of work to another. Jobs themselves are, perhaps, not so complex as 
the people who hold them, but they too are highly differentiated. 
Neither individuals nor jobs are close substitutes for one another. 
The idea that people  can readily be switched  from job to job 
would appear to stem from the idea that labor  time is a commodity 
with a coherent meaning,  and this is an extension of 19th century 
abstractions  about labor which have if anything  lost their slight 
purchase  in real world  conditions  over the course of the present 
century. The manual worker with general skills hired out by the day 
for odd jobs at a negotiable wage is a fringe case. Everybody  else 
is  linked  to  a  social  network  that  dictates  within  broad  bands 
terms  of employment  specific  to their skills  and background.  The 
small actions that lend intuitive plausibility  at the micro  level 
to the concept of a market for fish ("Atlantic  Salmon $5.99 special 
today!") are never observed  in the so-called  "market for labor." 
Most  economists  seem  to  have  forgotten  that  John  Maynard 
Keynes  quite powerfully  demolished  the supply curve  for labor  in 
the opening pages of the ; nrlTh  r 
Monev. Keynes showed that there was no reason to expect that, say, 
an  excess  of  unemployment  would  drive  down  real  wages.  The 
remaining workers would still rationally  resist reduction of their 
money wages, and even if this failed the subsequent  fall of money 
wages would bring down prices, leaving real wages unaffected. Labor 
markets do not respond like fish markets  to excess supply, because 
10 wages  are  too big  a part  of  total  costs.  The  "second  postulate"  of 
the  classical  doctrine,  the  supply  curve  of  labor,  failed  as  a 
logical  construct. 
But,  of  course,  the  non-existence  of  a  viable  supply  curve 
implies  that  the  market  for  labor  itself  is  not  a  market  in  the 
meaningful  sense  of  that  term  (cf.  Parguez,  forthcoming).  Without 
a supply  curve,  one  has  no  market,  and  the  "equilibrium"  of  wages 
and  employment  cannot  be  determined  "there."  One  is  forced  to  look 
outside  the  classical  confines  of  the  labor  market  to  find  the 
determination  of  employment  and  of wages.  In other  words,  one  needs 
to  once  again  build  a macroeconomic  and  specifically  a  Keynesian 
theory. 
If  the  concept  of  an  aggregate  labor  market  and  the  powerful 
but  misleading  metaphor  it embodies  could  be  wiped  at  a stroke  from 
the  professional  consciousness,  what  would  be  the  result?  Plainly, 
there  would  then  be  no  reason  to  associate  any  particular  value  of 
the  unemployment  rate  with  pressure  on  wages  in  general,  or  on 
prices  and  inflation.  The  concepts  of  the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment  and  NAIRU  would  then  certainly  collapse.  Economists 
would  be  obliged  to  find  ways  of  evaluating  the  evidence  governing 
both  inflation  and  unemployment  without  granting  privileged  status 
to  the  idea  that  the  two  are  linked.  The  policy  notion  that 
controlling  the  reduction  of  unemployment  is  a  sensible  means  of 
controlling  inflation  would  also  lose  its  power. 
Employment  policy  might  then  be  concerned  with  the  work  to 
be  done:  whether  to  match  this  or  that  person  with  this  or  that 
task.  Inflation  policy  would  be  concerned  with  the  management  of 
particular  elements  of  cost,  including  wages  but  not  neglecting 
materials,  rent  and  interest.  Management  of  aggregate  demand  --  an 
undoubted  force  on  non-wage  prices  --  could  operate  through 
channels  with  less  effect  on  employment  (a variable  tax  on  rents 
and  quasi-rents,  for  example).  Since  wages  are  a major  element  in 
costs,  inflation  policy  would  in particular  be  concerned  with  the 
existence,  extent  and  management  of  specific  institutional 
mechanisms  of  pattern  bargaining,  which  transmit  destabilizing 
pressures  from  one  part  of  productive  apparatus  to  another.  These 
would  come  to  be  seen  as  among  the  prime  forces  differentiating 
between  stable  and  unstable  aggregate  price-cost  outcomes. 
All  of  this  would  be  an  enormous  intellectual  improvement,  for 
it would  divert  research  from  the  ephemeral  pursuit  of  abstract  and 
elusive  scalars  into  the  analysis  of  a much  more  complex  realm  of 
data,  such  as  already  characterizes  the  more  productive  veins  of 
research  in  labor  and  financial  economics  today.  It  would  also 
instantly  expand  the  scope  of  acceptable  policy  discussion.  It would  turn  many  thousands  of  unemployed,  now  abandoned  to  fate, 
into  reasonable  candidates  for  re-employment  on  reasonable  public 
or public/private  projects,  physical,  intellectual  and  cultural,  at 
reasonable  terms.  But  for  this  to  happen,  it  is  evidently  not 
enough  just  to  raise  doubts  about  the  aggregate-labor-market  theory 
of  aggregate  wages.  For  if  wages  are  not  determined  in  the  labor 
market  but  rather  in  context-  and  institution-specific  patterns, 
what  exactly  are  these  patterns  and  how  are  they  are  they  to  be 
made  into  legitimate  objects  of  social  inquiry? 
The  Job  Structure 
The  Danish  Prince  missing  from  the  Hamlet  of  much  modern 
economic  thinking  is the  job  structure.  Mesmerized  perhaps  by  the 
magic  words  of  "adjustment,"  "efficiency,"  and  "equilibrium," 
economists  actually  tell  themselves  that  a  theory  cannot  be  good 
unless  it  purges  itself  of  any  "rigidities,"  "institutions,"  and 
other  context-specific  or  ad  hoc  considerations.  Thus  criteria  of 
esthetic  conformism  come  to  rule.  It  is  a  profoundly  biased 
mindset,  and  one  which  bears  little  resemblance  to  scientific 
practice. 
What  is the  job  structure ? It is  a historically,  socially  and 
politically  specific  set  of  status  and  pay  relationships  in  the 
economy,  within  and  between  firms,  within  and  across  industries. 
I will  simply  assert  here  that  a  job  structure  always  exists,  and 
has  to  exist,  in  every  society.  Otherwise,  relative  pay  would  be 
wholly  underdetermined  --  market  forces  being  insufficient  to  do 
the  job  of  setting  wage  rates  and  job  characteristics  --  and  chaos 
would  prevail. 
Job  structures  may  be more  or  less  flexible,  and  more  or  less 
stable  at different  moments  of  time.  They  are  obviously  not  immune 
to pressures  from  markets.  But  they  have  the  effect  of  distributing 
those  pressures  across  the  structures  (like  shock  waves  hitting  a 
building).  Occasionally  a  structure  may  collapse  under  pressure. 
But  for  the  most  part  the  effect  of  having  structure  is  to  slow 
down  changes  and  to  distribute  them  in  ways  which  may  not  be 
predictable  to  those  focused  intently  on  market  characteristics. 
Relative  Waues  in Micro  Theorv 
The  standard  textbook  does  contain  a theory  of  relative  wages. 
Demand  for  labor,  undergraduates  are  told,  is  governed  by  the 
marginal  productivity  of  labor  --  by  the  inverse  relationship 
between  the  amount  of  employment  offered  and  value  of  the  output 
12 produced  in  the  last  hour  worked.  Technology  is  so  arranged  by 
firms  that  higher-valued  workers  will  be  hired  first,  and  higher- 
valued  jobs  performed  first  --  anything  else  would  violate  canons 
of  rationality  underpinning  the  whole  construct. 
In principle  this  solves  the  differentiated-labor  problem.  We 
assume  that  the  relevant  grading,  sorting  and  ordering  are  carried 
out,  so  that  holding  everyone  to  their  predetermined  "best"  place 
the  market  can  work  as  if  it  were  like  a  fish  market  "at  the 
margin."  Why  then  do  wages  differ  within  the  margin?  Because  jobs 
differ:  hard  and  dangerous  work  must  be  compensated,  human  capital 
accumulation  rewarded.  In  other  words  infra-marginal  wage 
differentials  are  a  matter  of  "labor  rent:"  special  payment  to 
scarce  elements  of  human  capital,  or  to  artificial  scarcities 
imposed  by  unions  and  other  social  forces. 
But  there  are  at  least  two  fatal  difficulties  with  this.  The 
first  is  that  the  mechanism  for  determining  marginal  productivity 
in  a  differentiated  job  structure  no  more  exists  than  does  any 
meaningful  market  for marginal  workers.  There  is no  evidence  at  the 
micro  level  that  firms  make  any  effort  to calculate  marginal  value. 
Nor  is  there  any  automatic  mechanism  to  calculate  it  for  them; 
natural  selection  does  not  work  as  many  economists  have  long 
supposed  to  assure  such  a  result.  There  is  therefore  no  reason  in 
the  empirical  world  to  accept  that  the  marginal  value  of  output 
actually  does  fall  as  employment  increases. 
Second,  while  the  notion  of  labor  rents  is  indeed  plausible, 
it  remains  necessary  for  labor-market  theory  that  the  non-rent 
element  of  labor  compensation  be  a  significant  fraction  of  the 
total  wage.  If  all  or  most  of  wages  are  in  fact  compensation  for 
the  rental  value  of  specific  human  capital,  then  the  aggregative 
labor  market  simply  dissolves.  Segmentation  rules. 
Segmentation  and  the Job Structure 
Even  if we  allow  some  pressure  of  labor  demand  to  put  up  real 
wages  at  the  margins  of  the  labor  market,  extreme  differentiation 
and  segmentation  may  mean  that  there  is  not  any  mechanism  that 
transmits  this  pressure  to wages  generally.  A  construction  boom  in 
my  home  town  affects  the  employment  and  maybe  (but don't  bet  on  it) 
the  wages  of  construction  workers;  it affects  the  value  of my  home; 
but  it has  no perceptible  effect  on my  wage  as  a college  professor. 
Therefore  it  cannot  lead  through  me  or  others  like  me  to  any 
general  pressure  on  costs  and  prices. 
In this  case,  there  can  only  be  general  pressure  on  costs  and 
prices  from  specific  excess  demands  for  labor  if  there  exists  some 
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pressures.  An  example  might  be  pattern  bargaining  that  is  itself 
linked  to  cyclically  sensitive  wages  or  to  commodity  price 
pressures.  Or  an  economy-wide  indexation  scheme. 
Technologv,  Trade  and  the  Patterns of Waaes 
In  practice  the  wage  structure  has  been  under  intensive 
scrutiny  lately.  And  the  empirical  literature  on  changes  in 
relative  wages  in  the  United  States  seems  to  exist  in  a different 
discipline  from  that  concerned  with  inflation,  unemployment  and  the 
labor  market.  It is as  if economists  have  persuaded  themselves  that 
one  set  of  forces  and  influences  (namely,  aggregate  demand  and 
supply)  governs  how  many  people  will  enjoy  employment,  a second  set 
(monetary  policy)  governs  inflation,  and  an  entirely  different  set 
(accumulation  of  skill s)  governs  the  disposition  of  relative  pay. 
There  now  exist  many  studies  that  attempt  to  explain  the 
dramatic  rise  in  the  inequality  of  before-tax  wage  and  salary 
incomes  over  the  last  two  decades.  A  common  conclusion  of  many, 
endorsed  in  derivative  works  by  Reich  (1992),  Krugman  (1994)  and 
the  Council  of  Economic  Advisers  (1994,  1995),  is  that  changes  in 
technology  have  generated  a vast  change  in the  distribution  of  real 
returns,  raising  them  for  those  with  advanced  skills  and  cutting 
them  for  most  everyone  else. 
In particular,  the  vast  spread  of  computers  into  the  culture 
has  captured  the  attention  and  imagination  of  these  scholars,  and 
created  in  their  minds  and  in  the  wider  community  the  suspicion 
that  a  new  apartheid  has  come  into  existence,  between  the 
technological  haves  and  technological  have-nots,  between  those  who 
are  electronically  literate  and  those  who  are  not.  This  same  idea 
has  also  spread  to  the  aberrant  quarters  of  the  political  culture, 
where  it  surfaces  in Charles  Murray's  notions  about  an  IQ elite  and 
Newt  Gingrich's  proposals  to  subsidize  laptops  for  the  poor. 
Thus  the  ancient  parable  in  modern  form.  A  new  technology 
(exogenous,  as  always!)  has  appeared.  It  opens  great  pathways  to 
productivity,  but  presents  at  the  same  time  new  hurdles.  Skills  are 
required  before  the  new  machines  can  be  mastered.  Those  who  master 
the  skills  are  rewarded;  the  fruits  of  the  new  productivity  gains 
are  theirs.  Those  who  fail  fall  by  the  wayside. 
The  parable  is appealing,  and  not  just  for  analytical  reasons. 
It  contains  at  least  four  elements  that  are  actually  reassuring. 
First,  it  reaffirms  that  a  disconcerting  present  event  is 
nevertheless  within  the  general  context  of  social  progress. 
Computerization  and  the  productivity  gains  it brings  are  doubtless 
14 good  for  society  overall  (who can  doubt  it?).  Second,  it places  the 
onus  for  overcoming  the  new  hurdles  of  computer-literacy  squarely 
on  the  individual,  allowing  only  a  modest  and  thoroughly 
conventional  role  for  government  assistance  in  some  cases,  and 
leaving  the  ex post  distribution  of  incomes  unchallenged.  Third,  it 
leaves  the  implication  that  the  disconcerting  problem,  the  rise  in 
inequality,  is  itself  a  transitional  phase,  for  when  computer 
skills  are  sufficiently  widespread  labor  market  mechanisms  assure 
that  the  skill  differential  must  fall.  Fourth,  because  the  parable 
is told  within  the  framework  of  a  standard  supply-and-demand  model 
of  the  labor  market,  it  leaves  no  reason  to  suppose  that  any 
preconception  of  macroeconomic  analysis  would  be  disturbed.  All 
that  is  changing  is  relative  pay  --  not  employment,  not  the 
susceptibility  to  inflation. 
But  is  the  parable  true.  7  The  evidence  on  which  it  rests  is 
little  more  than  an observed  association  at  the  level  of  individual 
workers  between  increased  use  of  computers  (and  other  supposedly 
advanced  equipment,  including  curiously  copying  machines)  and 
higher  rates  of pay.  This  is not  dispositive.  It  is surely  possible 
that  some  other  effect,  such  as  a  shift  of  profitabilities  across 
branches  of  industry,  is  jointly  responsible  for  rising 
computerization  and  rising  pay.  Empirical  studies  so  far  make 
little  serious  effort  to dismiss  this  possibility.  (For  a critique 
of Bound  and  Johnson  on  this  point,  see  Galbraith  and  Calmon  1994). 
The  parable  is  essentially  an  argument  about  the  demand  for 
unskilled  labor.  If  it were  true,  there  are  some  things  one  would 
expect  to  observe.  First,  employment  would  be  expected  to  have 
declined  sharply  among  uncomputerized  service  workers  in  such  areas 
as  banking  and  insurance  where  computerization  is  rife.  Has  it?  I 
know  of  no  study  showing  such  employment  effects.  The  computers 
have  on  this  evidence  contributed  to  altering  the  wage  structure, 
but  nothing  to  productivity  on  average.  That  would  be  strange  if 
there  really  did  exist  a  labor  market. 
Second,  one  would  expect  the  effects  of  computers  to  be 
uniform  inside  the  country  and  out,  and  across  countries 
irrespective  of national  income  level.  What  is  true  for  the  United 
States  and  Europe  ought  to  be  equally  true  for,  say,  Brazil  or 
China.  But  this  is  not  the  case.  Indeed,  when  one  compares  the 
advanced  to  the  developing  regions,  a dramatic  asymmetry  of  effect 
appears.  Whereas,  in  the  U.S.  and  Europe  the  relative  wage 
advantage  has  flowed  to  those  working  in  the  advanced  sectors, 
while  the  relative  position  of  the  semi-skilled  worker  has  fallen, 
in  the  LDCs  it  is  semiskilled  wages  that  have  risen  relative  to 
other  levels  of  skill.  (Wood,  1994) 
15 This  asymmetry  is  flatly  inconsistent  with  a  technology- 
driven,  labor-demand  model  of wage  change.  But  it is consistent 
with a model of North-South  labor substitution.  What then remains 
is to explain by what channel that substitution transmits pressures 
onto American  wages. 
The argument that trade has not affected the wage structure in 
the United States rests on two bulwarks: a 1992 AER lead article by 
Bound  and  Johnson  and  a  1993  Brookings  Paper  by  Lawrence  and 
Slaughter.  Both  have  since been  strongly  criticized  though  they 
remain influential. 
The  Bound  and  Johnson  paper  rests  on  a  bit  of  negative 
econometrics  --  a  failure  to  find  the  pressure  of  trade  on 
employment  is  translated  into  the  absence  of  a  trade  effect  on 
wages.  Wood  (1994)  however  showed  that  the  Bound/Johnson 
calculations  depended on their use of Northern  labor coefficients 
for  industrial  categories  most  vulnerable  to  migration  to  the 
South. The problem with this is that those branches  or  elements of 
the same industries which actually migrated  have much higher  labor 
coefficients, and so the effect of shifting employment due to trade 
is much much higher -- ten times higher  in Wood's  estimate  -- than 
Bound and Johnson allow for. Wood then makes  a pair of additional 
calculations  that  raise  the  effect  of  North-South  trade  on  the 
demand for unskilled labor by a further factor of four, so that in 
the end the Bound-Johnson estimate of a 0.5% contribution  of trade 
to  declining  unskilled  labor  demand  is  corrected  to  a  20% 
contribution  -- accounting  for nearly all of it. Here, of course, 
the disappearing-job effects that one has difficulty finding in the 
pink-collar  trades are conspicuous by their presence. 
The Lawrence-Slaughter paper employs a series of calculations 
whose  general  validity  has  been  sharply  challenged  in  the  same 
venue  (Sachs and Shatz,  1994). However  the main  issue is whether 
there exists any channel whereby the pressure of rising imports can 
actually be felt in the American  labor market.  If imports sell at 
the  same price  as home  goods, how can home wages be depressed  by 
import competition  ? Lawrence  and Slaughter reply that they cannot 
be, pointing to the fact that the home prices of imported goods do 
not in fact appear to decline as trade expands. Rather,  it is the 
world  prices  of  exported  American  goods  that have  declined  most 
sharply, a fact that can explain the downward pressure  on average 
real wages  (since the price of exports has fallen relative to the 
price  of  imports  and  since  exportables  tend  to be  capital  goods 
which do not enter into the consumption basket  as importables  do) 
but not the rise in inequality. 
The  difficulty  in principle  with  this  argument  is  that  it 
assumes away all channels of effect on nominal wages that are not 
16 transmitted through textbook market mechanisms. Lateral linkages in 
the wage-bargain  are  simply  ruled  out  a priori.  Thus  effects  on 
relative wages which may well be due to the pressure of competition 
from low-wage suppliers of comparable  goods or a rise in the real 
exchange  rate -- the threat mechanisms  in the bargaining  game -- 
are  invisible  to the model,  and must  be  attributed  to  something 
else.  As  elsewhere  in  economics  (notably,  growth  theory), 
technology takes the fall, and the subject spins off yet again into 
explaining  the inexplicable by the unmeasured. 
The Structural Aporoach 
A  structural  approach  to relative  wage  determination  starts 
from the proposition that there exists no single solution given by 
patterns  of demand  and supply to the labor-pricing  problem.  Once 
the possibility of multiple solutions is admitted,  then the choice 
between possibilities becomes, very quickly, a matter of historical 
developments and social relations. If "market forces" per se do not 
dictate exact outcomes they can at best act as influences within  a 
social matrix. 
In other work, Paulo Calmon and I  (1994) have outlined  a set 
of  procedures  for  dissecting  the  social  structure  and  for 
identifying its largest and most prominent groupings. Our groupings 
are  preeminently  industrial 
example, the  rise and decline 
sectors  (autos,  construction 
relative  immunity  of  wages 
protected  or  supported  by 
and  policy-related.  We  show,  for 
of labor power in the heavy-industry 
equipment);  the  steady  rise  and 
in  advanced  technology  industries 
government  policies  (aerospace, 
chemicals,  agriculture);  the collapsing  position  of more  weakly- 
organized workers in sectors exposed to international  trade  (light 
industry,  apparel).  Our procedures  are  quite  general  and  can be 
used with other  types of data,  e.g. Calmon's  1993 application  of 
the  same  techniques  to  the  Brazilian  social  structure  using 
expenditure  data from the Brazilian  government budget. 
The  effect  of  this  work  is  to  focus  attention  on  power 
groupings  (and membership  therein),  and  far,  far  away  from  the 
economist's  typical  preoccupation  with  rates  of  return  to 
individual  acquisition  of  skill.  It  is  to  identify  a matrix  of 
quasi-political  relationships,  a  job  structure,  whose  elements 
change only slowly over time. And  it is to illustrate,  as we do in 
these papers, the overwhelming importance of macroeconomic policies 
and  events  for  the  differential  performance  of  groups  situated 
differently  -- supported differently,  protected  differently  -- in 
the world economy. 
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groups  in  the  American  job  structure:  an  advanced  group  with  many 
associated  members  whose  position  was  protected  by  government 
policy  (notably,  trade  protection);  a heavy-industry  group  whose 
fate  varied  with  the  auto  contract;  a  light-industrial  group  under 
strong  pressure  from  imports;  textiles  in  transition;  garment- 
making  in  deep  competitive  trouble,  and  a group  in  the  middle.  We 
found  a number  of  important  idiosyncratic  cases  --  steel,  computers 
--  whose  wage  paths  were  subject  to  special  influences.  Job 
structures  are  complex.  But  through  them,  we  are  able  to make  a  far 
stronger  case  for  the  effect  of  trade  on  wages  than  emerges  from 
analyses  that  ignore  structural  relationships  in  the  data. 
Perhaps  most  notably  for present  purposes,  our  analysis  of  the 
patterns  of  change  of wages  in  services  showed  that  there  appear  to 
be  linkages  between  service  wages  and  what  is  paid  in  associated 
manufacturing  sectors.  The  path  of  wages  in  shoe  stores  resembles 
that  in  leather  manufacture  more  than  it  resembles  the  path  of 
wages  in grocery  stores,  which  in  turn  resembles  the  path  of  wages 
in  the  breweries  and  bakeries.  This  sort  of  finding  increases 
confidence  in the  importance  of  a job  structure,  since  predictions 
based  on  a labor  market  analysis  would  surely  predict  the  reverse. 
Without  going  into  further  details,  we  can  ask,  what  is  the 
meaning  of  a "job  structure"  for  macroeconomic  analysis?  The  first 
and  most  important  answer  is  that  it  replaces  the  construct  of  an 
aggregative  labor  market.  If  most  wage  relations  are  determined 
laterally  --  by  reference  to  comparison  units  within  the  job 
structure  --  then  skill  acquisition  is  a matter  of  credentialing 
for  membership  in  the  group,  and  not  essentially  a  matter  of 
productivity  or  productivity-related  wage  enhancement  per  se.  The 
question  of  the  necessity  and  appropriateness  of  specific  education 
and  training  for  specific  tasks  may  then  be  raised:  are  these 
investments  really  productivity-enhancing,  or  merely  a  way  of 
rationing  slots?  And  also,  more  fundamentally  still,  the  issue  of 
the  appropriate  differentials  between  groups  returns  to  the 
political  context.  What  should  garment  workers  be  paid,  relative 
to  auto  workers  (or lawyers) ? If  this  is  not  a market  question  -- 
which  given  the  huge  productivity-adjusted  differentials  across 
markets  and  countries  within  each  of  these  industries  it  cannot  be 
--  then  it  is and must  be  a political  question  and  one  that  should 
be  faced  more  or  less  squarely. 
The  structural  approach  to  relative  wages  is  not  new.  The 
older  generation  of  labor  economists  in  the  U.S.,  led  by  John 
Dunlop  espoused  it  and  studied  the  wage  structure.  So  did  trade 
unions  establishing  coordinated  or  solidaristic  wage  bargains  in 
Japan  and  Europe  in the  postwar  period  --  bargains  which  obviously 
did  not  impair  macroeconomic  performance.  And  in  Latin  America  in 
18 the  198Os,  national  approaches  to  the  wage  bargain  have  been  a 
feature  of  every  stabilization  effort,  notably  the  comparatively 
successful  Pacto  de  Solidaridad  in  Mexico,  which  held  things 
together  until  they  were  blown  apart  by  the  debt  strategy  that  led 
to  the  PRI  election  victory  in  1994  and  the  peso  crisis  immediately 
after. 
We  come  then  to the  question  of  policy  should  be  organized  if 
structure  matters.  It  is  not  an  easy  question,  and  one  which, 
coming  at  the  end  of  an  already  longish  essay,  demands  more  space 
than  it will  get. 
Liberals  Stuck  on  the  Supplv  Side 
At  the  very  least,  New  Keynesian  acceptance  of  the  New 
Classical  theoretical  structure  reduces  macroeconomic  policy  to  the 
fringe  role,  that  of  large-scale  intervention  only  in  deep  and 
lasting  recessions.  In  all  other  circumstances,  the  macro 
authorities  are  warned  off  --  as  was  President  Clinton  himself 
during  his  brief  Keynesian  phase  in early  1993.  Perhaps  the  economy 
will  speed  up  on  its  own,  perhaps  a  stimulus  will  be  excessive, 
perhaps  the  demons  of  inflation  will  be  prematurely  unleashed. 
What  then  can  liberals  do?  The  actual  approach  of  the  Clinton 
administration  illustrates.  Liberals  can  favor  labor  training, 
education,  adjustment  assistance  and  other  programs  that  help 
workers  move  from  one  job  to  the  next.  They  can  support  public 
investments  in  infrastructure,  on  the  ground  that  these  assist  in 
the  international  competitiveness  of  the  economy.  They  can  support 
a  combination  of  research  and  development  assistance  to  advanced 
enterprises,  alongside  efforts  to  open  foreign  markets  to American 
products,  that  help  shore  up  the  position  of American  companies  in 
the  world.  If  they  are  feeling  brave,  they  can  also  support  a 
higher  minimum  wage. 
All  of  these  are  supply  side  measures  (except  the  last,  which 
is a direct  intervention  in the  labor  market).  Their  purpose  is  to 
improve  the  long-term  competitive  performance  of  the  American 
economy,  on  the  thought  that  a  more  productive  economy  will 
generate  higher  average  living  standards.  The  further  thought,  that 
these  higher  averages  will  'trickle  down'  to  low-paid  production 
workers,  is  left  as  an  assumption. 
We  can  all  agree,  I suppose,  that  expenditures  on  education, 
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good  things.  Unfortunately  for  liberals,  however  --  and  here  I 
choose  my  words  with  precision  --  there  is  little  direct  evidence 
that  they  help  the  measured  performance  of  the  economy  in  any 
definite  way.  The belief  that  they  will  do  so is  essentially  an  act 
of  blind  faith,  often  asserted  but  with  remarkably  little 
persuasive  supporting  documentation. 
Education  & Training 
From  an  economic  standpoint  the  educational  system  of  the 
United  States,  taking  public  and  private  efforts  together,  is much 
more  successful  than  its many  detractors  admit.  We  attempt,  spend, 
and  also  achieve  a  great  deal  --  both  on  behalf  of  the  strongest 
and  the  most  disadvantaged  students.  The  system  is  unquestionably 
deficient  in  important  respects.  It  includes  large  public  school 
systems  where  resources  are  starved  and  education  is  said  not  to 
occur.  This  is a social  and  political  tragedy  and  a cultural  crime. 
These  failings  have  much  to  do  with  the  persistence  of  race-based 
differences  in  the  earnings  and  opportunity  structure. 
But  do  they  matter,  much,  for  the  average  level  of  economic 
performance?  Are  American  schools  a  drag  on  productivity?  That 
question  turns  on  whether  there  is  a  shortage  of  skilled  labor  in 
the  present-day  United  States.  There  is  no  such  shortage!  To  the 
contrary,  our  economy  is  full  of  highly  educated  and  skilled 
people.  It  is  short  of  jobs  for  those  people,  as  every  college 
counselor  and  every  coordinator  of  a training  program  knows.  This 
cannot  be  surprising:  we  have  not  for decades  created  large  numbers 
of  truly  good  jobs.  (And in a country  where  business  interests  have 
such  a  huge  influence  over  education  policy  as  here,  it  would  be 
bizarre  if  high  schools,  colleges  and  universities  were 
undersupplying  business  markets.) 
Some  argue  that  at  higher  levels  of  employment  even  larger 
investments  in  education  and  training  would  be  needed,  to  remedy 
skill  shortages  that  might  emerge.  But  even  this  is  doubtful.  A 
better  job  situation  would  pull  existing  students  out  of  schools 
and  colleges  and  into  the  labor  force,  reducing  the  numbers  who 
stay  in  school  to mark  time.  It would  also  encourage  firms  to  put 
more  of  their  own  resources  into  the  training  they  really  need. 
Full  employment  would  improve  conditions  in the  academy,  increasing 
resources  and  making  a  better  match  between  the  skills  students 
seek  and  the  jobs  that  exist.  But  there  is  no  compelling  reason  to 
think  that  either  more  or  less  education-time  would  be  needed:  the 
effects,  in principle,  cut  in both  directions. 
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Certainly  government  R&D  and  export  assistance  helps  American 
companies  penetrate  foreign  markets,  increase  market  share,  improve 
technological  competitiveness  ---  and  pay  higher  wages.  But  here 
there  is  another  problem.  Who  benefits  from  these  policies?  The 
number  of  workers  who  work  directly  in  export-oriented,  high- 
technology  manufacturing  sectors  is  small  --  not  over  six  million 
by  a generous  count.  They  are  the  primary  beneficiaries  and  they 
are  already  comparatively  well-paid  --  at  the  top  of  the 
manufacturing  wage  ladder. 
Workers  and  consumers  outside  the  favored  sectors  benefit  at 
most  indirectly,  for  example  from  the  multiplier  effects  of 
increased  export  earnings  and  from  the  spread  of  new  technologies 
into  products  that  consumers  use.  But  this  process  also  has  losers 
--  the  workers  whose  skills  become  obsolete  and  whose  jobs 
disappear.  Those  who  argue  for  technology  and  industrial  policies 
often  forget  about  this  damage.  And  with  no  full  employment  policy, 
retraining  for  these  workers  is  at  best  a placebo. 
It  is  surely  acceptable  for  liberals  to  form  alliances  with 
the  captains  of  aerospace,  communications  and  computers,  with  the 
John  Youngs  and  John  Sculleys  as  Clinton  did  in  1992,  in  order  to 
gain  power  and  achieve  something  else.  There  is  surely  a  role  in 
general  terms  for  science  and  technology  policy  --  ultimately  and 
all  in  all  new  technologies  lead  to  a better  life.  But  these  do 
not  and  cannot  bring  full  employment,  nor  do  they  bring  about  a 
fairer  and  more  just  social  order.  To make  science  and  technology 
policies  into  the  centerpiece  of  a progressive  agenda  is  absurd. 
Infrastructure 
Public  works  expenditure  is  the  historical  cornerstone  of 
liberal  interventionism.  Public  works  are  the  fastest,  most  direct 
way  to put  the  unemployed  to work.  They  have  direct  and  multiplier 
effects  on  total  employment.  They  have  the  side  benefit  that  the 
works  themselves  remain  useful  for  many  decades  after  they  are 
completed.  They  also  represent,  in political  memory,  the  triumph  of 
liberalism  in  the  first  New  Deal. 
But  the  liberal  supply-siders  make  an  entirely  different  claim 
for public  works  spending.  Renaming  it  'infrastructure,'  (as I too 
have  done  on  many  occasions)  they  argue  that  it  contributes  in 
definite  ways  to  the  productivity  of  the  private  business  economy. 
The  jobs  created  directly,  by  doing  the  work,  are  immaterial  to 
this  argument.  What  matters  is  how  the  finished  work  contributes 
indirectly  to  cost  reduction  and  to  output  in  the  private  sector. 
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Almost  all  of  it  rests  on  aggregative  statistical  relationships, 
essentially  on  the  bare  fact  that  average  measured  productivity 
growth  declined  during  the  same  years  that  saw  cutbacks  in  gross 
public  investment.  Almost  none  rests  on  detailed  analysis  of  the 
contribution  of  particular  projects  to  business  efficiency.  That 
kind  of  evidence  (a  high-tech  boom  in  Appalachia  following  the 
Great  Society's  road  programs  there,  for  instance)  would  be  much 
more  persuasive.  But  it  doesn't  exist. 
And  this  should  not  be  surprising.  Export-oriented  American 
manufacturing  enterprise  is  not  seriously  hamstrung  by 
infrastructure  problems.  Roads,  rail,  electricity  and  water  service 
are  adequate  to  their  needs.  Boeing  is  not  short  of  runways  from 
which  to  launch  its  planes,  nor  is  Silicon  Valley  suffering 
brownouts.  Phones  work  well  in  this  country!  Pollution  costs  do 
not  necessarily  fall  on  private  business  producers,  but  on  their 
neighbors.  Indeed,  given  a  choice,  many  would  prefer  to  pollute 
than  to  have  the  government  pay  for  clean-up  projects. 
Infrastructure  and  associated  environmental  spending  is 
undoubtedly  of  enormous  need  and  value.  But  to  whom?  To  the 
American  citizen,  as  an  element  in  the  standard  of  living.  Roads, 
water,  sewer,  power  and  communications  systems  are  all  durable 
public  consumption  goods.  It is  consumers,  and  workers,  not  in  the 
main  business  shippers,  who  hit  the  potholes  on  the  road  to  work. 
It is people  who  breathe  the  air,  drink  the  water,  and  boat  on  the 
rivers  and  lakes.  All  this  has  little  to  do  with  international 
competitiveness,  which  is  very  sad,  but  true.  (This  explains  why 
business  interests  are  not  demanding  higher  infrastructure  spending 
and  why  these  items  were  the  first  to  fail  in  the  face  of 
Republican  opposition  in  the  Congress.) 
We  are  left  with  the  unpleasant  conclusion  that  the  liberal 
mainstream  has  been,  to  a  degree,  fooling  itself.  Education, 
training,  and  infrastructure  are  very  important,  but  not  for  the 
competitiveness  and  productivity  reasons  usually  cited.  Business 
doesn't  need  them,  they  don't  enjoy  business  support,  and  it  is 
wishful  to  argue  to  business  that  they  should. 
As  political  liberals,  we  who  care  about  education, 
infrastructure  and  the  environment  must  find,  instead,  a  language 
in which  to defend  such  programs  for  their  inherent  worth,  for  the 
sake  of  the  people  themselves.  We  must  find  ways  to  organize  the 
people  around  them  for  the  vital  direct  benefits  they  bring  (as 
indeed  the  environmental,  consumer  protection  and  health  and  safety 
movements  have  traditionally  done).  Otherwise  they  will  continue  to 
lose  the  budget  battles. 
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growth,  full  employment  macroeconomics,  for  example.  Nothing  less 
stands  the  slightest  chance  of  working. 
Macro  Policv  in  a  Structuralist  World 
The  essential  macro  question  in  a  structuralist  theory 
concerns,  not  employment  or  inflation,  but  the  structure  itself. 
What  should  be  the  distribution  of  incomes?  How  much  range,  between 
the  botton  and  the  top?  Between  high  risk/high  return  and  low 
risk/low  return?  Between  capital  and  labor?  Between  skill  and  not? 
These  are  political  issues  and  have  to  be  resolved  by 
political  means.  Collective  bargaining  is  one  such  means.  Income 
and  wealth  taxation  is another.  Minimum  wages  are  a third.  If  these 
are  not  available,  something  else  has  to be  devised.  Leaving  it  all 
to  the  "market"  is,  of  course,  possible.  Market  outcomes  and  their 
associated  mythology  have  a  great  advantage:  they  induce 
introspection  (worker,  blame  thyself!)  and  reduce  social  conflict. 
But  the  structuralist  perspective  tells  you  that  you  gain  no 
efficiency  thereby,  and  are  sure  to  generate  more  misery  than  you 
could  have. 
A  second  key  question  concerns  adjustment  of  the  wage 
structure.  By  what  principle  should  real  wages  change?  Surely,  on 
average,  at  the  rate  of  productivity  growth.  But  should 
productivity  gains  be  distributed  to  the  individual,  to  the 
industry,  or  to  the  economy  as  a whole? 
A  structuralist  perspective  points  to  a general  preference  for 
structural  stability,  once  (if!)  a  reasonable  consensus  about 
appropriate  differentials  has  been  reached.  It  is probably  better 
to  distribute  productivity  gains  as  broadly  as  possible,  to  make 
them  social  rather  than  industrial  or  individual.  It  is  clearly 
better  to  avoid  arbitrary  perturbations  to  the  structure,  such  as 
arise  when  there  are  shocks  to  the  general  price  level  and  some 
groups  are  better  indexed  than  others.  A  common  indexation  scheme, 
preferably  discretionary  and  linked  in practice  to what  the  economy 
can  afford  rather  than  to any  statistical  indicator,  could  prove  a 
useful  tool  in  keeping  the  structure  stable.  I wrote  a book  about 
this  seven  years  ago  (Galbraith,  1989);  to  no-one's  surprise  it 
didn't  sell. 
Third,  what  of  employment  ?  If  structure  stabilizes  relative 
wages  and  neutralizes  wage  pressures  percolating  backward  from 
growth  sectors,  there  is  no  longer  any  inflationary  labor  market 
barrier  to  full  employment.  The  reserve  army  of  the  unemployed 
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without  it,  and  because  the  stabilization  of  the  income  structure 
removes  the  incentive  for  employers  to maintain  a climate  of  fear. 
The  issue  is  therefore  not,  how  many  jobs?  but  rather,  who  to 
employ  and  on  what  (and  for  how  many  hours)?  The  issue  of  who  to 
train  and  for  which  function  may  have  some  importance,  but  much 
experience  holds  that  people  train  themselves  when  they  have  an 
incentive  (such  as  good  conditions  and  decent  pay)  to  stay  on  the 
job.  At  present  the  economy  is  short  of  jobs,  not  of  skills. 
Stabilization  of  investment  demand  is  then  the  central 
macroeconomic  issues  related  to  employment.  Countercyclical  public 
investment  is  a  possibilty,  using  revolving  funds  as  a  finance 
facility  for  states  and  localities.  The  Swedes  used  to  accomplish 
the  trick  with  private  business  through  tax  policy,  allowing  tax- 
free  deposits  of profits  into  blocked  accounts  during  booms,  to  be 
released  for  tax-free  investment  in  slumps.  This  seems  more 
reasonable  than  countercyclical  profits  taxes,  which  might  to  the 
stabilizing  trick  at  investment  levels  too  low  to  assure  full 
employment.  Progressive  taxation  of  distributions  and  realized 
capital  gains  --  a consumption  tax  aimed  at  the  rich  --  seems  worth 
exploring  but  may  lack  the  requisite  countercyclical  element.  Given 
ratchet  effects  and  leakages  to  imports,  countercyclical 
consumption  boosters  seem  the  wrong  way  to  go. 
Alongside  stabilization  of  investment  demand  one  has  to  think 
of  technological  renewal.  It makes  sense  progressively  to  shut  down 
the  back  end  of  the  capital  stock,  for  environmental,  safety  and 
competitive  reasons.  Properly  designed  regulation  can  help.  At  the 
same  time,  a  flatter  wage  structure  and  bigger  safety  net  would 
reduce  the  cost  of  job  loss  and  the  resistance  from  affected 
workers. 
As  for  interest  rates,  low  and  stable  has  to be  the  watchword. 
Interest  rates  should  lose  their  present  macroeconomic  function. 
They  should  serve  instead  to  arbitrate  the  distribution  of  income 
between  debtors  and  creditors,  capital  and  entrepreneurship.  They 
should  therefore  be  stable  and  low.  Real  rates  of  return  on  money 
should  be  zero.  And  there  is  no  reason  why  long-term  rates  of 
interest  in real  terms  should  exceed  the  long-term  real  growth  rate 
of  the  economy.  Indeed  they  should  lie  below  this  value,  effecting 
a  gradual  redistribution  of  wealth  away  from  the  creditor  and 
toward  the  debtor  class  and  a long-term  stabilization  of  household 
and  company  balance  sheets.  Speculation  in  fixed  asset  markets,  an 
ancillary  risk,  should  be  heavily  taxed. 
If  nominal  wages  rise  in  line  with  productivity,  average 
prices  will  be  stable  outside  of  shocks  to  non-wage  elements  of 
cost.  Commodity  stockpiles  could  help  curb  the  shocks.  If  debt 
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relying  on  low  nominal  interest  rates  to  keep  the  class  structure 
in  order.  Difficulties  in  the  debt  structure  can  be  weathered 
through  a  modest  upward  tilt  in  nominal  prices  and  wages.  As 
Congressman  Henry  B.  Gonzalez  has  well  said,  zero  inflation  is  for 
the  graveyard. 
Trade  bears  watching  under  structuralism.  I  am  reluctant  to 
impose  barriers  to  trade,  for  technological  reasons:  too  much 
structure,  too  little  creative  destruction,  and  you  end  up  like  the 
Soviet  Union.  On  the  other  hand,  industrial  development  strategies 
clearly  matter.  The  more  advanced  your  industries,  the  fewer 
production  workers  you  need,  the more  service  workers  you  can  have, 
and  the  higher  your  standard  of  life  relative  to  the  world.  (But 
equally,  the  more  public-goods  consumption  you  have,  the  fewer 
imports  you  need  for  a  given  living  standard,  and  fewer  exports 
you  have  to  do.) 
OK,  it's  a fantasy.  But  the  point  is  that  there  is  no  good  in 
thinking  half-thoughts,  or  agreeing  to  half-measures  from  the 
outset.  The  liberal  microeconomic  supply-side  can  do  some  useful 
things  --  or  thought  it  could  --  by  getting  a  little  money  into 
education,  training,  infrastructure.  But  the  point  is  to  raise 
living  standards,  increase  security  and  leisure,  provide  jobs  that 
are  worth  having.  And  one  cannot  do  that  while  the  grand  viziers  of 
macroeconomic  policy  are  left  free  to disrupt  output  and  employment 
and  to  redistribute  income  from  working  people  to  the  rich. 
*** 
James  K.  Galbraith  teaches  economics  to  unsuspecting  students  of 
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